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Petition of Plaintiffs-RespondPnts for RPhearing 
and Bri0f in Support Thereof 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs sePk judgment rPquiring tlw State Insur-
anC(' Fund to hear its sharp proportionately as its in-
2 
terest appears, of attorneys' feL•s and cm;ts incurred bv . •' 
plaintiffs in recovering from third parties, 8Ums paid 
to or for plaintiff8 by the Fund for medieal and ho8pital 
expenses and for compensation for injurie:-; occasioned 
by on-the-job accidents caused by such third partie's. 
DISPOSITION IN Lff\VER COURT 
Plaintiffs received Summary Judgment by Memo-
randum Decision based upon agreed facts. Defendants 
appealed. 
DISPOSITION ON APPEAL 
The Supreme Court reversed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiffs-respondents seek rehearing and affinna-
tion of the District Court judgment and a detennination 
that costs as well as attorney fees are reimbursable. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Supreme Court Decision states the facts. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiffs-rt'spondents petition the Court for a re-
hearing for the following reasons: 
POINT I 
A REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED SO THAT 
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS WILLIAMS, SCOTT, MELO, 




THIS COURT HAS ALLOWED RETROACTIVE RECOV-
ERY IN WORTHEN AND DENIED RETROACTIVE RECOV-
ERY IN THE CASES AT BAR. THIS DECISION, IF Alr 
LOWED TO STAND, WOULD RESULT IN UNJUST AND 
UNNECESSARY DISCRIMINATION AND WOULD ALSO 
RESULT IN DENIAL TO PLAINTIFFS OF THEIR STATU-
TORY RIGHT TO HAVE THE COMPENSATION CARRIER 
PAY ITS FAIR SHARE OF THE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
COSTS. 
POINT III 
THE COURT HAS JUDICIALLY ALTERED THE EN-
ACTMENT DATE OF SECTION 35-1-62 TO THE PREJUDICE 
OF PLAINTIFFS. 
POINT IV 
THIS COURT, BY ALLOWING RETROACTIVE RECOV-
ERY IN WORTHEN AND DENYING RETROACTIVE RE-
COVERY IN THE CASES AT BAR, HAS DENIED PLAIN-
TIFFS THEIR RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS 
CONTRARY TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
POINT V 
THIS COURT, BY ALLOWING RETROACTIVE RECOV-
ERY IN WORTHEN AND DENYING RETROACTIVE RE-
COVERY IN THE CASES AT BAR HAS DENIED PLAIN-
TIFFS THEIR RIGHT TO "UNIFORM OPERATION" OF 
LAWS UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 2 AND ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 24 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
POINT VI 
THE INSTANT DECISION IS INCONSISTENT WITH 
WORTHEN VS. SHURTLEFF. 
POINT VII 
WORTHEN VS. SHURTLEFF, 19 UTAH 2d 80 SHOULD 




A REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED SO THAT 
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS WILLIAMS, SCOTT, MELO, 
McNEELEY, AND ROEDEL CAN MAKE THEIR ORAL AR-
GUMENT. 
Counsel of record for the above nanwd Plaintiffs 
are Gayle D<->an Hunt and Dwight L. King. rrl1rough 
apparent clerical error, tl1ey were never notified of the 
date of oral argument. It is possible the notice meant 
for them was placed in an envelope addressed to Richard 
Leedy, attorney for Defendant and Appellant, because 
a check with Mr. Leedy reveals that he has an indistinct 
memory of receiving two notices. 
Because of the importance of the issues here in-
volved and because counsel for the above named Plain-
tiffs feel very deeply that tlrny should be allowed to fully 
argue tht> issues raised by this petition and by llieir 
original hril'f, respectfully request this Honorable 
Court to grant a rehearing. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT HAS ALLOWED RETROACTIVE RECOV-
ERY IN WORTHEN AND DENIED RETROACTIVE RECOV-
ERY IN THE CASES AT BAR. THIS DECISION, IF AL-
LOWED TO STAND, WOULD RESULT IN UNJUST AND 
UNNECESSARY DISCRIMINATION AND WOULD ALSO 
RESULT IN DENIAL TO PLAINTIFFS OF THEIR STATU-
TORY RIGHT TO HAVE THE COMPENSATION CARRIER 
PAY ITS FAIR SHARE OF THE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
COSTS. 
The Utah State Legislature enacted Utah Code An-
notated 35-1-G2 into law in the year 1945. The construc-
tion placed on that statute presumably followed the 
5 
riresent \Vorthen construction nntil Octolwr 24, 1962 when 
this Court decided the McConnell case. On April 3, 1967 
this Court in vV orthen held the McConnPll interpretation 
was incorrect. Now this Court reaffirms the \Vorthen 
interpretation but denies recoHry to tlw plaintiffs. Why 
does this Court allow recoyery in \V orthen and deny 
recovery We submit that the plaintiffs are en-
titled to a definitive answer consistent with the simple 
dictates of justice. 
This Court, b>r allowing recovery in "\Vorthen and 
denying it here has adopted the "first man to the court-
room" test in determining whether to apply retroactive 
or prospective effect to a later interpretation of a statute. 
In Utah it is no longer a question of who has a just cause 
that determines the result. The question would now 
seem to be who is more effective at the art of being first 
to get his case on a court calendar. For example: 
(1) A and B are injured on the same day in indus-
trial accidents. They file their cases on the 
same day. The clerk places A's case on the 
trial calendar first. A recovers. B comes to 
court, through no fault of his own. on the fol-
lowing day. B cannot recover because of this 
court's present holding as to retroactivity. 
(2) A is injured in an industrial accident before B. 
A files his case before B. In the clerk's shuffling 
of cases B's case goes to trial first. Under the 
present ruling B recovers and A doesn't. 
6 
r:rhe race to thP courtroom shouldn't determine who 
receivPs the bent>fits of this statute. The statute itself 
should determine who benefits it. Let U8 bear in mind 
that this Court has now twice decided that Rec. 35-1-G2 
was meant by the legislature to allow recovery to lWrsons 
situated in the po8ition of plaintiffs. Assume \Vorthen 
didn't exist. have seven plaintiffs presently hefort> 
thP Court. Suppose Scott had reached the courtroom 
first, should the other six fail? How ah out 1\'Ielo? How 
about RoedPl f Yet such is thP position in which the 
Court and con8equently the trial bench and bar find 
themselvPs in view of the decision in this case. If justice 
demandPd a departure from logic, that would be one 
thing. But lwre justice demands a return to logic. The 
legislature intended from the date it pas8ed Section 35-1-
62 into law that compensation carriers bear their share 
of attorney's fees and cost8 in third cases. This 
8tatute as interpreted unquestionably coincides 
with justice. It can hardly be arguPd a8 an abstract 
concept of fairness that comppm;ation carriers should 
he allO"wed free rides. The McConnell decision was based 
on a highly technical language interpretation and by 
allowing the compensation carrier a free ride and re-
quiring someone else to pay for that ride caused and 
brought about a long line of unju8t results. \Vhy, then, 
should not this injustice be limited giving retroactive 
effect to this Conrt's pre8ent interpretation of the stat-
ute? \Vhy should \Vorthen rt>cover and these plaintiffs 
he denied recon•ry? If there had been no \Vorthen case, 
one of thesP plaintiffs would have recovered. We be-
7 
lieve this Honorable Court should grant a rehearing 
so that these matters can be fully argued. 
POINT III 
THE COURT HAS JUDICIALLY ALTERED THE EN-
ACTMENT DATE OF SECTION 35-1-62 TO THE PREJUDICE 
OF PLAINTIFFS. 
As heretofore pointed out, Section 35-1-62 was en-
acted into law in the year 1945. This Court has held 
in Worthen and also in the cases at Bar that said statute 
requires compensation carriers to pay their share of 
attorney's fees and costs in third party cases. In view 
of this interpretation, we must conclude that the legis-
lative intent has continued to be the same from 1945 to 
the present and that that intent is to not allow any free 
rides on the part of compensation carriers in third party 
cases. During the period of time behveen McConnell and 
Vv orthen this Court is presumed to have followed Mc-
Connell. This was because of a technical interpretation, 
not because the result was fair because quite obviously 
it wasn't. Now, that interpretation has been modified 
so that it coincides with justice. But this Court, by 
denying retroactive effect to its decision, has modified 
the effective date of Section 35-1-62, which was deter-
mined by the legislature to be 19±5 and has said that 
behveen October 24, 1962 and April 3, 1967, except for 
one case, the Worthen case, this statute will be inapplica-
ble. This Court has said in refusing to give retroactive 
effect to the Worthen decision that to do so "would 
amount to judicial legislation." agree that our appel-
8 
late courts should not judicially legislate. Our position 
is that to slice a piece of time out of the period during 
which a statute Pxists on the books as a valid law and 
by judicial fiat to say that that statute will not be 
enforced and n•cognized as the law of the land during 
said piece of time, constitutes judicial legislation and 
violates fundamental conc<c•pts of separation of powt>rs 
in a democratic form of govenment. 
POINT IV 
THIS COURT, BY ALLOWING RETROACTIVE RECOV-
ERY IN WORTHEN AND DENYING RETROACTIVE RE-
COVERY IN THE CASES AT BAR, HAS DENIED PLAIN-
TIFFS THEIR RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS 
CONTRARY TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution insofar as material here reads as follmvs: 
"No State shall make or enforce any law ... 
nor deny to any person 'lvithin its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws." 
\Vhile it is true that t>qual protection of laws does 
not rPqnire absolute equality of treatnwnt in all situa-
tions, it does protect citizt>ns against unequal treatment 
hy resort to pm·ply arbitrary and nebulous classifications 
or differences. This has been t>xplained in several United 
States Supreme Court cases. 
In liValter" vs. City of St. Louis (Mo. 1954) 347 U.S. 
231, 74 S.Ct. 505, 98 L.Ed. 660, the Court stated: 
"Equal protection doPs not require identity 
of treatment. It only requires that classification 
9 
rest on real and not feigned differences, that the 
distinction have somP relevancP to the purpose for 
which the classification is made, and that the 
different treatments be not so disparate, relative 
to the difference in classification as to be wholly 
arbitrary. Cf. Dominion Hotel Inc. v. State df 
Arizona, 249 U.S. 412, 57 S.Ct. 172, 81 L.Ed 1193; 
New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New 
York, 303 U.S. 573, 58 S.Ct. 721, 82 L.Ed. 1024; 
Skinner v. State of Oklahoma ex. rel. "Williamson, 
316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 110, 86 L.Ed. 1655. 'In its 
discretion it may tax all, or it may tax one or 
some, taking care to accord to all in the same class 
equality of rights.' SouthwPstern Oil Co. v. State 
of Texas, 217 U.S. 114, 121, 30 S.Ct. 496, 54 L.Ed. 
688." 
The Supreme Court of the United States has also 
made it very clear that the equal protection clause is 
directed to every form of state action, whether legisla-
tive, executive or judicial. 
See Yick Wo v. H opkius (1886) 118 L.S. 356, 373-
374, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220, where the Court stated: 
"* * * Though the law itself be fair on its face, 
and impartial in appearancP, if it is applied 
and administered by public authority with an 
evil eye and an unequal hand, so practically 
to make unjust and illPgal discriminations between 
persons in similar circumstances, material to their 
rights, the denial of equal justice is still within 
the prohibition of the constitution." 
In Shelley v. Kraemer (1948) 334 F.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 
836, 92 L.Ed. 1161, the Court emphasized that State Court 
actions come within the equal protection of laws provi-
10 
sion of the United States Constitution. There the Court 
stated: 
''rl'he short of the matter is that from the time 
of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 
until the present, it has been the consistent ruling 
of this Court that the action of the States to which 
the Amendment has reference, includes action of 
state courts and state judicial officials. Although, 
in construing the terms of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, differences have from time to time been 
expressed as to whether particular typt'S of state 
action may be said to offend the Amendment's 
prohibitor>' provisions, it has never been sug-
gested that state court action is irrnnunized from 
the ope.ration of those provisions simply because 
the act is that of the judicial branch of the state 
government.'' 
\Ye take the position that allowing retroactive recov-
<c·ry in vY orthen and denying retroactive recove.ry in the 
seYen cases now before the Court constitutes a denial 
of equal protection of laws for the reason that there 
is simply no substantive distinction between the cases 
which should allow inequality of treatment. As here-
tofore pointed out, the distinction this Court has fastened 
onto is that the winner of the race to the courtroom re-
covers and the losers don't. This is true regardless of 
\\ hich accident happenPd first and regardless of which 
case is filed first. In a sense, a deputy county clerk 
really decides who "Wins when he jockeys the cases onto 
the court calt>ndar. this kind of distinction satisfy 
the reqnirernent of equal protection of laws? We respect-
fully submit that the seven plaintiffs now before the 
11 
Court art> entitled to a ddinitive answer. 
VVe do not contend that a court eannot apply a new 
decision prospectively. Courts have often done this under 
different circumstances than exist in the cases at Bar 
on the theor)' that the new distinction amonnts to new 
law. This theory does not hold up lH'l'P for reasons dis-
cussed at Points II and III in this bri(:'f. But even if 
this Court were to decidP on a pros1wctive application 
of a new interpretabon of Section 35-1-fi2, it could not 
give retroactive recovery to Worthen, allow that decision 
to become final, and then refuse the same treatment to 
the seven plaintiffs here without violating the equal pro-
tection of laws concept. 
We take the position that an Appellate Court, if it is 
to comply with the requirement of equal protection of 
laws in applying a new decision must come 
within one or the other of three distinct categories. 
First, it could adopte the rule that no case which 
had be,en finally determined would come under the new 
decision. This is the basis which the Supreme Court of 
the United States has used in recent cases involving such 
matters of exclusion of evidence, violation of the right 
to counsel, etc. See for example Walters i:. City of St. 
Louis, Mo., supra. 
The cases at Bar do not come \\'ithin any such 
possible distinction. They weren't ewn filed and most 
certainly \Yere not finally determined at the time vVorthen 
was given retroactive effect by this Court. 
12 
Seco11d, it could adopt the rule that no case would 
be given the bt>nefit of the new decision. rn1is could be 
a reasonable breaking off point JH'O\'iding all litigants 
werP treated alik<>. But here Worthen was given retro-
active effect and the cases at Bar were filed afte·r 
Worthen. Consequently, the Court here is laboring under 
a total disability to make date of filing the determining 
factor. 
Third, it could adopt the rule that the new decision 
would apply only to transactions which occurred subse-
(1nent to the ne\Y decision. But here again a Court can-
not the new decision to the circumstances of the 
case hefore it and then refuse to apply the new decision 
to other eases coming before it under substantially the 
same circmustances without violating the equal protec-
tion of laws concept. In addition, the transactions in each 
of the cases at Bar occurred after the transaction in 
Vvorthen. 
\Y orthen rt>covered his attorney's f eeis hut the Plain-
tiffs here haYe been denied rt>co\·e1-y although their causes 
of action arose under substantially the same circum-
stanePs. The attempted division of \V ortlwn and the 
seven cases at Bar into different categories is tenuous 
and lacking in substance. This Court has made fish of 
one and foul of another. Equal justice demands equal 
treatment. vV e respectfully request this Honorable Court 




THIS COURT, BY ALLOWING RETROACTIVE RECOV-
ERY IN WORTHEN AND DENYING RETROACTIVE RE-
COVERY IN THE CASES AT BAR HAS DENIED PLAIN-
TIFFS THEIR RIGHT TO "UNIFORM OPERATION" OF 
LAWS UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 2 AND ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 24 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
In Point IV of our brief we have called attention 
to the fact that Plaintiffs have been deprived of their 
right to equal protection of laws contrary to the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The Utah State Supreme Court has made it clear that 
interpretations of provisions of the United States Con-
stitution by the United States Supreme Court are highly 
persuasive in connection with interpretations of similar 
provisions of the Utah Constitution. See Unterrnyer v. 
State Tax Commission (1942) 102 Utah 214, 129 P.2d 
881. The provisions of the Utah Constitution applicable 
here are as follows: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 2. 
"All political power is inherent in the people; 
and all free governments are founded on their 
authority for their equal protection and benefit, 
and thev have the right to alter or reform their 
goverm{1ent as the public welfare require." 
(Italics ours) 
The other provision of the Utah Constitution ap-
plicahlP here is Constitution of Ptah, Article I, Sec-
tion 24. 
"All laws of a general natme shall have uni-
form operation." 
14 
The most frequently cited case setting forth the 
test of whether an arm of State Government violate,s the 
equal protection of laws requirement is Stale v. Mason, 
(1938) 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 920, where the Court states: 
"It is only where some persons or transac-
tions excluded from the operation of the law are 
as to the subject matter of the law in no differ-
entiable class from those included in its operation 
that the law is discriminatory in the sense of be-
ing arbitrary and unconstitutional. If a reason-
able basis to differentiate those included from 
those excluded from its operation can be found, 
it must be held constitutional." 
"* * * a classification is never unreasonable 
or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion features 
so long as there is some basis for the diff erentia-
tion between classes or subject matters included 
as compared to those excluded from its operation, 
provided the differentiation bears a reasonable 
relation to the purposes to be accomplished by 
the act.'' 
Other cases discussing the rule of law as it pertains 
to equal protection o.f laws under the Utah Constitution 
are as follows: 
State v. Bayer (1908) 34 U. 257, 97 P. 129; 
Salt Lake City'&. Utah Power and Light (1914) 45 U. 
50, 142 P. 1067; 
State v. Haltgreve (1921) 58 U. 563, 200 P. 894, 
aff'd. 285 U.S. 105, 76 L.Ed. 643, 52 S.Ct. 273; 
State v. Packer Corp. (1931) 77 U. 500, 297 P. 1013; 
Blackman i:. City Court of S.L.C. (1934) 86 U. 541, 
38 P.2d 725; 
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Carter t:. State Tax Commission, (1939) 98 U. 96, 96 
P.2d 727; 
State v. J.B.&R.E. Walker, Inc. (1941) 100 U. 523, 
116 P.2d 766; 
Untermyer v. State Tax Commission (1942) 102 U. 
214, 129 P.2d 881; 
Garrett Freight Lines, Inc. t:. State Tax Commission 
(1943) 103 U. 390, 135 P.2d 523; 
Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy District 
(1944) 106 U. 55, 145 P.2d 503; 
Gronlirnd t:. Salt Lake City (1948) 113 U. 284, 194 
l'.2d 464; 
Wallberg v. Utah Pitblic Welfare Commission (1949) 
115 u. 242, 203 p .2d 935 ; 
Tygesen v. Jlagna Water Co. (1950) 119 U. 274, 226 
P.2d 127; 
Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement System 
Board of Administrators (1952) 122 U. 44, 246 P.2d 591; 
Abrahamsen 1.i. Board of Review of I11d1tstrial Com-
mission ( 1955) 3 U .2d 289, 283 P .2d 213; and 
Justice v. Standard Gilsonite Co. (19Gl) 12 U.2d 257, 
366 p .2d 97 4. 
As can be seen the basic test of whether a classifica-
tion is unreasonable or arbitrary is said classifi-
cation "bears a reasonable relationship to the purposes 
to be accomplished by the act." 
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Turning to the case at Bar, tlit" legislative purpose 
to be accomplished by Section 35-1-62 wa8 to equitably 
distribute the burden of paying attorney8' fees and cost8 
between the injured party and the compensation carrier 
in third party ca8es. The intent was that said purpose 
be carried out following the effective date of 1945. It 
,,,.as the McConnell case that defeated that pnrpose. 
The judicial purpose of the Utah Supreme Court in 
deciding the reverse McConnell was to erase an incor-
rect decision and place in harmony once again the legis-
altive and judicial meaning of the statute. We submit 
that there is absolutely no reasonable relationship be-
tween the attempted classification of litigants by apply-
ing the "first man to the courtroom" test and the legisla-
tive and judicial purpose to be accomplished by the act. 
There is no basic reason consistent with that purpose 
for giving some compensation carriers a free ride and 
not others. Justice demands an opposite result. 
In Toronto ct ux. v. Sheffield et al. (1950) 118 U. 
460, 222 P.2d 594, action was commenced by Toronto 
against Sheffield to quiet title. The Trial Court entered 
judgment for Plaintiff, thus sustaining Plaintiff's claim 
that a certain four year Statute of Limitations barred 
the defense set up by Defendant. Defendant appealed on 
the basis that said four year Statute of Limitations en-
acted in 1939, which barred actions for recovery of real 
estate which had been sold for delinquent taxes after 
] 939 but did not bar such actions for sales made before 
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1939, was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Utah 
sustained Defendant's contention and reversed, stating: 
"Our state Constitution, Article 1, Section 24 
provides that 'all laws of a general nature shall 
have uniform operation.' And Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution 
forbids any state to 'deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws' 
• • • 
Here, there is no basis whatever for the dis-
tinction made. The conditions surrounding the 
sale to the county under (statute) since the 1939 
amendment and the objects and purposes thereof 
are exactly the same as those of (earlier and sim-
ilar statute) prior to that amendment. The only 
factual difference whatever is a slight change in 
t'hg procedure and the fact that the sale (made 
under the former statute mitst have been made 
before the one under the present statute a•rul 
therefore deals with a claim which is more stale. 
Certainly that fact would not justify tlie: distinc-
tion of barring the new claims while not barring 
the older ones. We therefore conclude that this 
differentiation between these two classes of sales 
bears no reasonable relation to the purposes to be 
accomplished by this act and therefore ho.ld that 
the discrimination against pcrsou.s who as plain-
tiffs here purchased tax titles transferred to the 
county under the statute in effect prior to the 
1939 amendment is arbitrary and unreasonable 
and therefore is unconstitidional." 
The analogy between Toronto and the cases at Bar 
rn obvious. In Toronto the legislature lifted the sales 
made before 1939 out of the act, set them aside, and 
18 
treated them differently. Why 1 Only because they were 
"more stale" than the later cases. But this difference, 
the Court said, "bears no reasonable relation to the pur-
poses to be accomplished by this act." The Court went 
on to say that the act was discriminatory and therefore 
unconstitutional. 
Here we have a judicial decision that does the same 
thing as did the legislative decision in Toronto. Here 
the Court has applied a judicial interpretation to W or-
then, thus accomplishing the legislative intent to have 
the compensation carrier pay its share of attorney's fees 
and costs, but has denied that same interpretation to 
plaintiffs in the case at bar, thus defeating the selfsame 
legislative intent. It is clear that because the "race to 
the courtroom" classification "brars no reasonable rela-
tion to the purposes to be accomplished" either by the 
legislature or by the judicial decision now under scrutiny, 
said decision is "arbitrary and unreasonable and there-
fore is unconstitutional." 
See also Sugarhouse Mercantile Co. v. Salt Lake 
County et al. (1950) 119 Utah 234, 225 P.2d 1050, to the 
same effect. 
POINT VI 
THE INST ANT DECISION IS INCONSISTENT WITH 
WORTHEN VS. SHURTLEFF. 
The decision in Worthen vs. Shurt.leff compels a 
decision for plaintiffs in the instant case. This court, 
on similar facts in Worthen vs. Shurtleff, 19 Utah 2d 80, 
426 Pac. 2d 223, ruled against tht-> Utah State Depart-
rnent of Finance as administrator of the State Insurance 
Fund and ruled that the State Insurance Fund should 
pay its share of costs and attorney's fees. 
In Worthen vs. Shitrtleff, the accident was Decem-
ber 2, 1964:, the Court order requiring payment by the 
Insurance Fund May 25, 1966 and tlw Supreme Court 
decision April 3, 1967. In the Walton, Simmons, Wil-
liams, Scott, Melo, McN eeley and Roedel cases, the acci-
dents were variously from April 27, 1962 to February 20, 
1964, th<:> payments under protest variously from October 
27, 1964 to .January 1967, the suits filed for recovery 
against the Insurance Fund from October 21, 1968 to 
April 30, 1969 and the Supreme Court decision, the in-
stant decision, January 29, 1970. 
The only conceivable way for the Supreme Court 
to hold as it did is to find that Worthen vs. Shurtleff 
created a new cause of action, created at the time of the 
<::·nactment of the statute, Section 35-1-62, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, but eliminated or suspend<:>d in 1962 by 
illcCom1cll i:s. Commissioner of Finance, 13 Utah 2d 395, 
375 Pac. 2d 394. But the inconsistency in that position 
is that Worthen vs. Shurtleff found, on its own facts, 
a cause of action to have existed since either the District 
Court Order requiring contribution March 25, 1966 or 
from the date services were rendered, the benefit of 
which the Fund enjoyed, sometime between tht> date of 
accident December 2, 1964 and date of said Order March 
25, 1966. 
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Had the instant cases been filed and argued simul-
taneously with Worthen vs. Shiirtleff, would their facts 
not have compelled the same result1 Obviously, yes. The 
instant cases are similar in all crucial respects to Worthen 
vs. Shurtleff and on the same principles must be decided 
the same way. 
Indeed, had the Worthen vs. Shurt.lt:ff case and these 
cases come on before this Court the same day, as they 
might wen have done, the payments in all five cases 
under protest to the Fund having been made in the 30-
rnonth period prior to the April 3, 1967 W ortlwn vs. 
Shurtleff decision, and had the Worthen vs. Shurtleff 
case been setlled on the Courthouse steps or before deci-
sion, the same arguments which sustained the Worthen 
'rs. Shurtleff decision would have compelled a similar 
decision here. 
But, let us examine the cases for essential differ-
ences. For that purpose, crucial dates are set forth as 
follows: 
(See chart on Page 23) 
It is essential to ask when did the cause of action 
arise1 Worthen vs. Shurtleff, itself, of necessity, recog-
nizes a cause of action to have arisen at an earlier date 
than its April 3, 1967 decision date. If then, the cause of 
action arose by the Insurance Fund's refusal to pay and 
if a four year statute of limitation is applicable, as the 
lower court ruled, then these cases almost have to be 
decided the same way as the Worthen vs. Shurtleff case. 
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The lower court's ruling as to the fonr year statute of 
limitations reads as follows: 
''l am also of the opinion that the four vear 
statute of limitations of Sec. 78-12-25 UCA i953 
applies since I consider that tlw action is based 
upon a contract for services rendered rather than 
an action for a liability created by statute Sec. 
78-12-26 (three year statute) or against an officer 
who is a tax collector, Sec. 78-12-31 (six month 
statute.)" 
If a three year statute of limitation should be ap-
plied, Williams, Scott, Melo, McN eeley and Roedel would 
fail, however Walton and Simmons still coud not possibly 
fail under the same reasoning of the W orthcn i's. Shurt-
leff case. 
Further examination of the case will reveal that the 
only essential differences between the instant cases and 
lVorthen vs. Slmrtleff is that in the Worthen vs. Shurt-
leff case the plaintiff refused payment altogether and in 
the instant cases, the Insurance Fund ·was paid under 
protest. 
Plaintiffs should not have to dPpend upon their pro-
t<=>st to prt>serve their rights to recover hack the payment 
as money had and received by the Insurance Fund and 
to which it was not entitled or, for money owed for 
compensation for services rendered. However, it is well 
established that when payment is made under protest, 
the protest preserves the rights of the protester. 
A protest is unnecessary where it would be useless, 
Illinois Glass Company vs. Chicago Telegraph Company, 
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85 NE 200. It i::-; evidPncP of eornpubion and unwilling-
ness to and notict> to the person to \rhorn tlH• pay-
ment is iua<ll' that tlw person payillg <lops not aeq11it>se1• 
in thP ilh·gal dPman<l and t1H·reli.r sttrr1•1Hlt·r up any 
right he may han• to recov<'r haek tl11· .• 1/ c.11 illr111 
u.;. Richards. Calif. 70 Arn. D<'c. 1)55. 
Espe{·ia1Iy :-;hould this lw so wher1· tlH· }H'rson mak-
ing payment is at a disadanvtage in ass<'rtion of his lPgal 
rights at the ti11w of payuwnt, and in suelt instaneP t]H· 
party ought to lw allO\n>d, as noted in -±0 A.111. .Jur., "Pay-
ments," Art. 185, pp. 842, to "assPrt his supposed right 
on reasonably equal tem1s," by making paynwnt and 
bringing suit later. 
Date of Date of Payment Date Suit Filed Date of Supreme 
Nam(' of Case Accident Under Protest Order Court Decision 
McConnell vs. Commissioner Oct. 24, 1962 
of Finance 
Worthen vs. Shurtleff Dec. 2, 1964 Paid into court Apr. 3, 1967 
Mar. 18, 1966 Mar. 25, 1966 
Walton vs. Utah State Apr. 27, 1962 Dec. 24, 1966 Jan. 20, 1969 Jan. 29, 1969 
Department of Finance 
Simmons vs. Utah State Apr. 27, 1962 January 1967 Jan. 20, 1969 Jan. 29, 1969 
Department of Finance 
Williams vs. Utah State Jan. 15, 1963 Oct. 27, 1964 Oct. 21, 1968 Jan. 29, 1969 
Department of Finance 
Scott vs. Utah State Mar. 6, 1962 Jan. 4, 1965 Nov. 15, 1968 Jan. 29, 1969 
Department of Finance 
Melo, McNeely, and Roedel Feb. 20, 1964 Jan. 5, 1966 Apr. 30, 1969 Jan. 29, 1969 
vs. Utah State Department 
of Finance 
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In Buford v:;. Lonergan, 6 Utah 301, 22 Pac. 164, 
Affirmed, 148 U. S. 581, 37 L. Ed 569, the Utah court 
sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States, 
held that party making payment less than voluntary and 
under protest was able to recover back the excess money 
paid even through all parties were in possession of all 
the facts. 
In that case, before the day of delivery of cattle 
purchased, plaintiffs paid a large part of the price but 
the defendant refused to deliver the cattle until the full 
balance of the alleged price was paid, whereupon plain-
tiffs paid it under protest, claiming theright to deduct 
the price of cattle allegedly not delivered. The court 
said, page 308 : 
"Plaintiffs were compelled to either pay this 
demand or seek redress by tedious and expensive 
litigation, the property hostile to plaintiff's inter-
Pst and liable to deterioration and loss. Payment 
under such cfrcumstances was not a voluntary 
payment, and, being made under duress, may be 
recovered back; and the fact that it was made 
with knowledge of all the facts makes no differ-
ence." 
POINT VII 
WORTHEN VS. SHURTLEFF, 19 UTAH 2d 80 SHOULD 
BE APPLIED CONSITENT WITH ITS OWN FACTS. 
The Court, in the instant case, said: 
" ... Since the construction of a statute in the 
light of existing judicial interpretation ( the Mc-
Connell case) is the precise issue herP, we think 
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and hold that, espousing such fiction here simply 
would amount to judicial legislation ... " 
We submit that this court has, in this instance, done 
'vhat it se,eks to generally avoid, i.e., judicially legislate, 
in that, as pointed out earlier, it changes the effective 
date of a statute and it applies on-again, off-again the 
obligation of the Insurance Fund to pa:': its own expenses 
as if the statute itself had changed. 
There are those cases where an overruling decision 
should be given only prospective effect but we submit 
that this is not such a case involving, as it does, only 
simple issues of debtor and creditor. As stated in numer-
ous cases, in 10 ALR 3rd 1371, the general rule is that 
a judicial overruling of a precedent has both prospective 
and retroactive effect unless the overruling decision de-
clares that it shall have only prospective effect. We 
agree the judicial overruling of a precedent should not 
be given retroactive effect where to do so would unfairly 
interfere with vested rights, contractual rights, domestic 
rights, boundary lines, public buildings already con-
structed, changes of position made in reliance upon the 
legislative interpretation: bonded indebtedness incurred 
based directly upon an interpretation, or other cases 
wheer the positions of parties have changed in reliance 
upon the interpretation. It is respectfully submitted that 
any such exceptions to the accepted general rule of retro-
activity has no application in these cases because the 
plaintiffs and defendant never entered into any contracts 
of any kind except by implication and because the rights 
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and obligations between them arise out of a contribution 
principle as enunciated by the terms of the Utah statute, 
and where no one has been, or could be inconvenienced 
by reliance upon the interpretation overruled. 
CONCLUSION 
We are aware of the fact that petitions for rehearing 
are not often granted. This is because ordinarily coun-
sel for the respective parties have been heard, and the 
issues have been fully met by the Court. 
The cases at Bar present a different situation. .As 
a result of clerical error counsel for five of the Plain-
tiffs has not been heard. Of greater importance is the 
fact that this Honorable Court's opinion gives rise to 
serious questions involving whether justice has been 
done, and whether the opinion itself is Constitutional. 
Most of these questions have never been presented be-
cause they are the offspring of the opinion itself. 
First, this Court's adoption of the "first man to the 
courtroom" test of retroactivity has defeated the legis-
lative intent to require compensation carriers to bear 
their share of attorney's fees and costs in third party 
cases. There is absolutely no legal necessity for this 
Court to judicially cause such an unjust result in the 
very face of a contrary legislative intent. 
Second, this Court's adoption of the "first man to 
the courtroom" test amounts to judicial legislation inas-
much as its effect is to lift a piece of time between 1962 
and 1967 out of the effective period of Section 35-1-62 
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and to give compensation caniers frpe ridPs during that 
time, contrary to the legislative intent. It is our position 
that this Honorable Court should not tamper with the 
effective date of a statute. 
Third, this Honorable Court, hy allowing retroactive 
recovery in \Vorthen and denying it ht>rP as denied Plain-
tiff their right to eqnal protPction of laws contrary to 
the United States Constitution. The division of \Vorthen 
and the cases at Bar into separate cla::ssifications on the 
basis of the "first man" to the courtroom" test is wholly 
arbitrary and discriminatory. 
Fourth, plaintiffs have likewise bet•n denied "equal 
protection and benefit" and "uniform operation" of laws 
eontrary to the Utah Constitution by adoption of the 
''first man to the courtroom" test. 
In conclusion we respectfully submit that Plaintiffs 
should be granted a rehearing in the interest of basic 
justice. 
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